“Bailout” Includes Authority To Suspend Market-To-Market Accounting Rule

Last week I wrote about how the effects of the financial market implosion would affect law firms.  The National Review has posted a discussion draft of the House version of the “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008″ and it appears that at least one of the suggestions made by former FDIC chairmain William M. Isaac made it into the bill:  the suspension of market-to-market accounting rules (or at least the potential for suspension).  

Under section 132 of the Act,

The Securities and Exchange Commission shall have the authority under the securities laws (as such term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)) to suspend, by rule, regulation, or order, the application of Statement Number 157 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board for any issuer (as such term is defined in section 3(a)(8) of such Act) or with respect to any class or category of transaction if the Commission determines that is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with the protection of investors.

Further, section 133 requires a study be done to determine:

 (1) the effects of such accounting standards on a financial institution’s balance sheet;

(2) the impacts of such accounting on bank failures in 2008;

(3) the impact of such standards on the quality of financial information available to investors;

(4) the process used by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in developing accounting standards;

(5) the advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards; and

(6) alternative accounting standards to those provided in such Statement Number 157.

Other provisions include (as reported by media outlets):

• creating an insurance program guaranteeing “troubled assets originated or issued prior to March 14, 2008, including such mortgage-backed securities”;
• creating a “financial stability oversight board” which will be responsible for:

(1) reviewing the exercise of authority under a program developed in accordance with this Act, including—

     (A) policies implemented by the Secretary and the Office of Financial Stability created under sections 101 and 102, including the appointment of financial agents, the designation of asset classes to be purchased, and plans for the structure of vehicles used to purchase troubled assets; and

     (B) the effect of such actions in assisting American families in preserving home ownership, stabilizing financial markets, and protecting taxpayers;

(2) making recommendations, as appropriate, to the Secretary regarding use of the authority under this Act; and

(3) reporting any suspected fraud, misrepresentation, or malfeasance to the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program or the Attorney General of the United States, consistent with section 535(b) of title 28, United States Code.

• foreclosure mitigation efforts, including a requirement that “the Secretary shall consent, where appropriate, and considering net present value to the taxpayer, to reasonable requests for loss mitigation measures, including term extensions, rate reductions, principal write downs, increases in the proportion of loans within a trust or other structure allowed to be modified, or removal of other limitation on modifications;”
• Mortgage assistance, including encouraging mortgage holders “to take advantage of the HOPE for Homeowners Program under section 257 of the National Housing Act or other available programs to minimize foreclosures.”  Such assistance also includes reduction of interest rate and reduction of loan principal;
• Prohibiting “golden parachutes” for executives of companies in the event of involuntary termination, bankruptcy filing, insolvency or receivership – although the terms aren’t included in the Act.  Instead, the Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to come up with guidelines within 2 months of the Act’s enactment;
• Minimize negative impact to taxpayers by selling the assets only when the asset’s value is high (among other provisions);
• Limiting authority to purchase assets to $250 billion at any given time, except when given the written certification by the President, in which case the amount may be up to $350 billion.  Congress then has 15 days to enact a joint resolution of disapproval – if none is made, the amount increases to $700 billion;
• Requiring the financial sector to reimburse the treasury for any assets sold at a loss.

To read all of the provisions of the House version, click here.

In my view, short term jubilee, long-term disaster and further eroding of capitalism in America.  As my contracts professor in law school would say when discussing government intervention in markets, “Hello Havana!”

How The “Market Meltdown” Affects Your Law Firm

This past week has been a scary time for the financial markets.  According to democrat Senator Chris Dodd last week, “we’re literally maybe days away from a complete meltdown of our financial system, with all the implications, here at home and globally.”  The New York Post reported that traders were “500 trades away from Armageddon on Thursday” with pre-open sell orders inundating the market and forcing the fed to pump $105 billion into the market to avoid a total collapse of the financial system.   There is little question that last week was historical.

I don’t believe that the end of this crisis is near.  The Executive Branch, along with the Federal Reserve, is planning a “bailout” (or what I would rather call a “clean out”) of the albatross of bad mortgage debt that is seriously deprecating the value of bank collateral and causing institutions to stop lending to each other.   Some are saying upwards of $1 trillion.  You can add another trillion to that (UPDATE:  Try $30 trillion).  And this is to just keep our financial system from collapsing.

The damage has already been done.  Our economy will be feeling the effects of the past week well into next year – and perhaps for several years to come (and I am not counting the effect of the massive printing of money to pay for the bailout).

What caused this to happen?  And how does it affect your law firm?  

In the Friday (September 19th) Wall Street Journal, William M. Isaac, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from 1981-1985, wrote an opinion piece titled “How To Save The Financial System“.  Mr. Isaac compared the current crisis with the one he faced when chairman of the FDIC – at that time, the prime rate was 21%, the savings bank industry was insolvent more than $100 billion, “the S&L industry was in even worse shape, the economy plunged into a deep recession, and the agricultural sector was in a depression.”  3,000 banks and thrifts failed.  However, if the rules that are in place now were in place then, Isaac argues, it could have been much worse:

The country’s 10-largest banks were loaded up with Third World debt that was valued in the markets at cents on the dollar. If we had marked those loans to market prices, virtually every one of them would have been insolvent. Indeed, we developed contingency plans to nationalize them.

The economic conditions of the current crisis were nowhere near as bad as it was then.  What caused an estimated 20% loss to mortgage debt to institutions that held them to bring our financial system to the brink of collapse?  Isaac believes “[t]he biggest culprit is a change in our accounting rules that the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the SEC put into place over the past 15 years: Fair Value Accounting.”  

Fair Value Accounting dictates that financial institutions holding financial instruments available for sale (such as mortgage-backed securities) must mark those assets to market.

The rule can be a boon for an asset when times are good.  However, a company must also “mark the assets to market even though there is no meaningful market”.  Even though the value of the assets are depressed because of market conditions, not actual value of the asset, regulators have still required that accountants continue to mark down assets as the market tanks.  This has led to heretofore financially secure banks to go to the brink of bankruptcy within days of bad news.  Isaac argues that regulators must suspend such rules when the health of the industry is at risk.  

On November 15th, 2007, Fair Value Accounting was officially enacted by the FASB in rule FAS 157.

Isaac also argues that regulators should suspend the “naked selling” (or short selling a stock without possessing it).  Late last week it was announced a ban on short selling altogether.  This sweeping measure was met with opposition by options traders, who argued that the ban was “a draconian measure that will result in the sudden and severe removal of liquidity from the marketplace.”  The argument is that disallowing short selling altogether prevents investors from learning the real value of a company – in essence, taking away information from investors – and thus will discourage investment.  Isaac only argues for the ban of “naked selling”, not all short selling.

Finally, Isaac argues that the new Base II regulations, though perhaps too new to have caused this crisis, must be suspended before they make matters worse:

Basel II requires the use of very complex mathematical models to set capital levels in banks. The models use historical data to project future losses. If banks have a period of low losses (such as in the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s), the models require relatively little capital and encourage even more heated growth. When we go into a period like today where losses are enormous (on paper, at least), the models require more capital when none is available, forcing banks to cut back lending.

Contrary to the rhetoric coming from both Presidential campaigns, the problem hasn’t been lack of regulation – but the regulations (and regulators) themselves.  At this point it is academic, and any remedy will not undue the damage done.  What firms need to do is prepare for cash flow problems in the near and long term.

As with any economic slowdown, transactional practices will suffer and litigation will do well.  However, if lending dries up, firms need to confront the possibility of losing significant numbers of corporate clients.  They also need to confront the high probability of clients having difficulty paying their bills.

As law firms are typically the bottom of every client’s stack of invoices (due to the lack of late fees and interest – unless you are one of those who actually charge for lack of payment), it may be a good idea to consider retainer billing your corporate clients.  Retainer billing simply requires a certain amount to be paid up front and set off against work performed.  When the retainer goes below a certain amount, a letter is sent to replenish the funds.  This ensures cash flow and, in coordination with setting budgets for services, can provide clients with some cost certainty – something corporate clients will be requiring with more and more frequency.

If your firm hasn’t addressed receivables that are over 90 days and don’t have a coherent, consistent, and reliable collections process, the time is now to develop and implement one.  It may be the difference between your firm managing a difficult economy and becoming a victim of it.